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Abstract 
In the gambling theory of Dubins and Savage, the payoff from a 
sequence of states is the limit supremum of their utilities. Here the 
limit infimum is used instead. For example, if the utility function is 
the indicator of a set G, then the Dubins and Savage payoff is 1 when 
infinitely many states are in G, while the payoff here is 1 when all 
but finitely many states are in G. There are some resulting changes in 
the theory, but it remains true that optimal stationary plans exist for 
finite problems. 
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1. Introduction 
Let (F,r,u) be a classical gambler's problem as defined by Dubins 
and Savage [3]. That is, F is a nonempty set and, for each f E F, r(f) 
is a nonempty set of probability measures (called gambles) defined on 
subsets of F. The utility function u is a bounded function from F into 
the real numbers. As is explained in [3], a gambler with initial fortune 
· f selects a s·trategy a (available) at f. The strategy _determines the 
distribution (also denoted by o) of the stochastic process f 1 ,f2, ••• of 
the gambler's future fortunes. The payoff to the gambler is defined to be 
(1.1) u(o) = lim f u(f ) do 
t t 
where the lim sup is taken over the directed set of stop rules and the 
optimal return function is, for each f E F, 
(1.2) V(f) = sup{u(o): a at f}. 
As explained by Dubins and Savage, they define u(o) as above because they 
"do not intend to appraise o in terms of fortunes visited early, nor 
to penalize a for visits to fortunes of low utility, however frequent, if 
these serve as stepping stones to fortunes of high utility." 
(1.3) 
The present paper is a study of the payoff defined by 
~(a) = lim f u(ft) da. 
t 
The corresponding optimal return function is 
(1.4) W(f) = sup{~(o): a at f}. 
The payoff ~(cr) also does not appraise a in terms of fortunes visited 
early. However, it does penalize a for visiting fortunes of low utility 
too frequently. 
There are alternative formulas for u(cr) and ~(cr) which may help 
to clarify their differences. Let H = FN be the set of all sequences of 
elements of F, and, for h = (f1 ,f2 , ... ) EH, define 
(1.5) u*(h) = lim u(fn), u*(h) = 
n 
lim u(f ). 
n 
n 
Then, by [2, Theorem 1] or [11, Theorem 3.2], 
u(a) = f u* dcr 
(1.6) 
u (a) = f u* da. 
In the special case when u is the indicator of a set Ge F, these 
formulas become 
(1. 7) 
u(a) = a[f E G i.o.] 
n 
~(a)= a[fn E G eventually], 
where "i.o." is short for "infinitely often" and "eventually" means "all 
but a finite number of n". 
One of the most interesting theorems [3, Theorem 3.9.1] in the book 
by Dubins and Savage states that if F is finite and if r(f) is finite 
for every f, then there is an optimal stationary plan for the lim sup 
payoff. The major result of this note (Theorem 3.1 below) is that the 
same theorem holds for the lim inf payoff. There are, however, payoff 
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functions for which the result fails. A simple example is in section 5. 
If r is leavable in the sense that the point mass o(f) is in r(f) 
for all f, then W = V (Proposition 4.1 below). Also, for any leavable 
problem with a bounded u, if e-optimal stationary plans are available for 
every e > 0 for the lim sup problem, they are also available for the 
lim inf problem (Theorem 4.2). A number of results already available for 
the lim sup problem can thus be carried over to the lim inf problem 
(cf. [5]). 
Unless the contrary is stated, notation and terminology are as in 
Dubins and Savage [3]. 
2. Preliminary lemmas. 
This section contains a number of lemmas, including a characterization 
of optimal strategies, which will be used in the construction of stationary 
plans in section 3. These results hold in the finitely additive setting of 
[3] and [7], and in the measurable, countably additive setting of [4] and [12]. 
Proofs will be presented for the finitely additive theory, but, with the 
addition of some measurability assumptions like those of [4] and [12], are 
valid for the countably additive theory as well. The major interest is in 
the finite case where the two theories coincide. 
Let E°(f) denote the collection of strategies a available at f in 
r and let E = U{r(f): f € F}. For every a, define 
·W(a) = f w* da = lim f W ( f ) da. 
t t 
Although u* is the payoff function studied in most of this paper, the 
first four lemmas are true for any payoff function g: H-+ R which is 
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bounded, measurable in the sense of [8], and shift-invariant. The proof 
of Lemma 1 below is essentially the same as that of Theorems 6(b) and 7 
in [12], the difference being that one must use finitely additive martingale 
convergence theorems from [7] and [8]. 
Lemma 1. For every f E F and o E r(f), the following hold: 
(a) W(f),W(f1), ... is a bounded supermartingale under o amd, hence, 
W(fn) "* w* = W* a-almost surely. 
(b) W(f) ~ W(o) ~ ~(o). 
(c) o[u* > w*] = O. 
A o E E(f) is called thrifty if equality holds in the first inequality 
of (b) and equalizing if equality holds in the second inequality of (b). 
Thus o is optimal if and only if it is both thrifty and equalizing. 
For e: ~ 0, 
gambles; that is, 
let r be the subhouse of r containing the e:-conserving 
e: 
r (f) ·= {y E r(f): yW > W(f) -d 
e: -
for every f E F, and let W be the corresponding optimal return function. 
e: 
The next lemma states that, if e: > 0, then a gambler who must use only 
e:-conserving gambles is not harmed. 
Lemma 2. For every e: > 0, w = w. 
e: 
Proof: Let O < o < e: and let f E F. Choose o € r(f) such that 
If t is a stop rule, then, by Lemma 1 and [3, formula 3.6.1], 
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and it follows from [10, Theorem 3] that (J uses only gambles available 
in r up to time t with probability at least 1 - o. 
e: 
Let a' be a strategy available in r 
e: 
at f such that a' uses 
the same gambles as (J whenever those gambles are available in r . 
e: 
Then, for every t, a' agrees with a up to time t with probability 
at least 1 - o. One can prove, by induction on the structure of ft, 
that 
where M = sup{lu(f) I: f E F}. (With only slightly more effort, one shows 
I Jg da - Jg' da I ~ 2 o sup I g I 
~(a') 2:, ~(a) - 2oM.a 
for all measurable g.) Hence, 
A problem (F,r,u) is finite if F is finite and, for every f, r(f) 
is finite. For such problems, there is no loss to a gambler restricted 
to 0-conserving gambles. 
Lemma 3. For finite problems, w0 = W. 
Proof: For some e: > o, and, hence, 
by Lemma 2.a 
w . 
e: 
But w = w by 
e; 
The next lemma should suggest why it is desirable to restrict attention 
to 0-conserving gambles. A strategy which always uses them is thrifty. 
Lemma 4. If r 0 = r, then, for every a EE, W(f) = W(a). 
Proof: Same as in [3, Theorem 3.6.1] or [12, Theorem 10]. 
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The next lemma gives a characterization of equalizing strategies 
analogous to that of Dubins and Savage for the lim sup payoff [3, Theorem 
3.7.2]. For E > O, let vE be the indicator function of the set 
{f: u(f) ~ W(f) - E}. 
Lemma 5. For f E F and a E t(f), W(a) = ~(a) if and only_ if 
E ! (a)= 1 for all E > 0. 
Proof: Suppose !e(a) = 1 for e > O. By (1.7), 
u(f) > W(f) - E 
n - n 
for all.but finitely many n with a-probability 1. Hence, 
a-almost surely 
and, consequently, 
~(o) = Ju* do.::_ Jw* do - e = W(a) - e. 
It follows from Lemma 1 that ~(a)= W(a). 
Now assume ~(a)= W(a). That is, 
f cw* - u*) do = 0 • 
It now follows from Lemma l(c) that 
(2.1) 
· for all E > 0. 
But 
lim(W(f) - u(f )) 
n n 
n 
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and, hence, w*(h) - u*(h) .::_ e: implies that 
but finitely many n. Thus (2.1) implies that 
u(f) > W(f) - 2e: 
n - n 
2e; ! (a) = La 
for all 
Lemma 6. If F is finite, f E F, and a E E(f), then a is equalizing 
iff 
cr{h: u(f) > W(f) eventually}= 1. 
n - n 
Proof: Let 
S = {f: u(f) < W(f)} 
and 
E = min{W(f) - u(f): f ES}. 
Then { f : u ( f ~ ~ W ( f) } = { f : u ( f) ~ W ( f) - e: / 2} • Now use Lemma 5 • a 
For a classical gambler's problem, equalizing strategies always 
exist [3, Theorem 3.8.4]. This is not true for lim inf problems as the 
following example illustrates. 
-1 Example: Let F = {1,2, .•• }; r(n) = {o(n),o{n+l)}; u(n) = 1 - n for 
n odd, u(n) = 0 for n even. Then W = 1 and there are no equalizing 
strategies available. 
Of course, "e:-equalizing strategies" must exist and the next lemma 
states that slightly more is true. 
Let We: be the optimal return function associated with the lim inf 
payoff for the problem e: (F,r,v ). 
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Lemma 7. If E > O, then WE= 1. 
Proof: Let o > 0 and f E F. Choose a E E(f) such that 2 ~(a)~ W(f) - o. 
By Lennna l(b), 2 ~(a)~ W(a) - o from which it follows, by an argument like 
that used in the second half of the proof of Lemma 5, that 
J(w* - ) d ~2 u* a< u 
and, hence, for o < E/2, 
a[w* - u* < E/2] > 1 - o. 
Thus 
E ~ (a) > 1 - a.a 
Lemma 8. If F is finite, then w0 = 1. 
Proof: For sufficiently small E > O, v0 = vE.a 
The final lemma of this section, which was suggested by a remark of 
Manfred Schal, is a O - 1 law for gambling houses. It is most easily 
stated using the following notation of Hill [6]: For S a Borel subset 
of H in the sense of [7] and f E F, define 
Pf(S) = sup{a(S): a E E(f)}, · 
and let 
P(S) = sup{Pf(S): f E F}. 
Lemma 9. If S is shift-invariant, then either P(S) = 0 or P(S) = 1. 
Proof: Suppose P(S) > 0. So 3a EE such that a(S) > O. By the Levy 
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0 - 1 law [8] and the shift-invariance of S, 
for h ES a-almost surely.a 
3. Optimal stationary plans for finite problems. 
Ar-selector is a function y with domain F such that y(f) E r(f) 
for all f. Such a selector y determines a stationary plan or family of 
co 00 E(f) strategies y . for each f, y (f) is that strategy in which uses 
' 
y(f') whenever the current position is £'. The 00 plan y is optimal for 
00 
the lim inf payoff if ~(y (f)) = W(f) for all f. 
----
Theorem 1. For every finite problem (F,r,u), there is a stationary plan 
00 y which is optimal for the lim inf payoff. 
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. So 
assume, for the rest of this section, that the problem is finite. 
By Lemma 2.3, it can be assumed that all gambles available are 
0-conserving and so, by Lemma 2.4, that all strategies are thrifty. It 
remains to show that there is a selector y 
for all f. 
and 
(3.1) 
Define 
G = {f: u(f) ~ W(f)} 
E = {h: f E G eventually}. 
n 
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such that y (f) is equalizing 
Then, by Lemma 2.6, it suffices to find y such that, for all f, 
(3.2)_ 00 y (f) (E) = 1. 
Recall that, in the notation of section 2, 
and 
where 
Lemma 1. 
0 W (f) = sup{o(E): a E L(f)}, 
GN = {h: f E G for all n}. 
n 
There exists an f E G such that 
Proof: Let E > O. Because F is finite, it is enough to find an f 
such that Pf(GN) > 1 - E. 
By Lemma 2.8, 3o Er such that o(E) > 1 - E. Also 
where 
00 
E = UC 
1 n 
C = {h: fk E G for all k > n}. 
n .. 
Since C t E and · CJ 
n 
is countably additive, 
Finally, 
o(C) 
m 
= J o[p ](GN) do 
G m 
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so that, for some h, 
Define 
f € G and 
m 
N 
a[p (h)](G) > 1 - e:. 
m 
Take 
Lemma 2. For every f € G0 , 3y E r(f) such that y(G0 ) = 1. 
f = f .a 
m 
Proof: Let f E G0 and suppose, to get a contradiction, that y(G0) < 1 - e: 
for some e: > 0 and all y € r(f). 
Consider first the case when G = G0 • Then, for a E E(f), 
which contradicts the assumption that f E G0 • 
Then 
Next consider the case when G - G 0 
a> 0 and, for all f' € G - G0 
is not empty. 
and a' E I:(f'), 
Let 
Consider next any o € I:(f) and calculate as follows: 
< (1 - a) + a (1 - E) 
= 1 - ae:. 
Hence, Pf(GN) < 1 - ae:, a contradiction.a 
- 11 -
- a. 
It should be clear that Lemma 2 provides good gambles on G0 • The 
next lemma suggests that, at an f not in G0 , the problem reduces to 
one of reaching G0 • To state the lemma, recall (3.1) and define 
E0 = {h: fn E G0 eventually}. 
Lemma 3. For every a Et, a(E) = a(E0). 
Proof: Let S = En {h: fn E G - G0 i.o.}. Then 
and it suffices to prove that a(S) = 0 for all a EE. This follows 
from Lemma 2.9 and the following fact: 
(3. 3) 
where 
a(S) < 1 - a, for all f and all a E I(f), 
(Assume G - G 0 
since the result is obvious otherwise.) 
To prove (3.3), let £ > 0 and fix a EE. Define 
'3(h) = sup{n: f ¢ G}. 
n 
is not empty 
Notice that Sc ['3 < 00]. So, by countable additivity of a, there is a 
positive integer M such that 
(3.4) a(S n [a 2_ M]) ~ a(S) - e:. 
Let 
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(The infimum of the empty set is taken to be ~.) Then Sc [T < ~]. So 
there is a positive integer N > M such that 
(3.5) a(s n [a 2 M] n [T ~ N]) ~ a(s n [a 2 M]) - e:. 
Let A = Sn [ r3 2 M] n [ T < N] and calculate as follows: 
(3.6) a(A) = J a[p ](Ap) da 
N T T T< 
2 f a[pT](GN) da 
T<N 
< 1 - a. 
Here the equality is by [3, formula 3.7.1); the first inequality holds 
because T ~ a on A and, hence, N Ap c G; the final inequality holds 
T 
by definition of a together with the fact that fT(h) E G - G0 for 
h EA. 
Inequality (3.3) follows from (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6).a 
Consider now the classical gambler's problem (F,r,u0) with 
lim sup payoff where u0 is the indicator of G0 • Let v0 be the 
corresponding optimal return function. 
Lemma 4. For all f E F, v0 (f) = 1. 
Proof: Let a> 0 and .f E F. By Lemma 2.8, there is a E r(f) such 
that a(E) > 1 - e:. Then, by definition of v0 , (1.7), and LeDDna 3, 
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The way is now prepared to complete the proof of (3.2) and with it 
the proof of Theorem 1. 
By Theorem 3.9.1 of [3], there is a r-selector a such that 
for all f. So, by Lennna 4 and (1.7), 
ClO 
a (f) [ fn E G0 i. o.] = 1 
and, hence, 
(3.7) 00 a (f)[L < 00 ] = 1 
where 
By Lemma 2, there is a r-selector a such that 
8(f)(G0 ) = 1 
for all f E G0 • Hence, 
for all f E G0 • 
Define the r-selector y to equal 8 on GO and to equal y on 
00 
F - G0 • By (3.7) the stationary plan y (f) reaches G0 with probability 
1 from any f E F - G0 and, by (3.8), stays in G0 forever with 
probability 1 after reaching it. Hence, 
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00 00 
y (f)(E0) = y (E) = 1 
for all f. 
The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete. 
Remark: The method of proof for Theorem 1 obviously owes a great deal to 
that of Dubins and Savage [3, Theorem 3.9.1] and also has similarities to 
the proofs of Theorem 2 in [14] and Theorem 3 of [4]. 
4. Stationary plans for leavable problems. 
Let P be a collection of plans for a gambling problem (F,r,u). 
Then P is adequate for the lim sup (lim inf) payoff if, for each e: > 0 
and f E F, 3cr E P such that 
(4.1) u(cr(f)) ~ V(f) - e: 
(4.2) (~(cr(f)) ~ W(f) - e:). 
If, for each e: > O, 3cr E P such that (4.1) (respectively (4.2)) holds 
for all f, then P is uniformly adequate for the lim sup (lim inf) 
payoff. For example, in finite problems the collection S of stationary 
plans is uniformly adequate in both senses by [3, Theorem 3.9.1] and 
Theorem 3.1. 
Theorem 2. Let (F,r,u) be a classical gambler's problem for which r 
is leavable and u is bounded. If S is adequate (uniformly adequate) 
for the lim sup payoff, then S is adequate (uniformly adequate) for 
the lim inf payoff. 
Theorem 2 will be an immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 
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below. 
Proposition 1. If r is leavable, then W = V. 
Proof: Obviously, W < V. Also, W is excessive by Lemma 2.1 and W > u. 
Hence, W > V by [3, Theorem 2.12.1] and [3, Corollary 3.3.2].a 
Until the end of the proof of the next proposition, assume r is 
leavable and u is bounded in absolute value by the finite constant M. 
Let o be in E(f) and define, for E > 0, 
(4. 3) '[ (h) = -r (h) = inf{n: u(f) > V(f) - e}. 
E n - n 
Define o' to be that strategy which agrees with o up to time -r 
and then stagnates. That is, for h = (f1,f2 , ••• ), 
'(f f) (f f) 1·f ~(h) > n, 0 1 ,•••, = 0 1 ,•••, L n n n n 
= o(f) 
n· 
if T(h) < n. 
Proposition 2. If u(o) ~ V(f) 2 
- E ' then 
2 ~ ( a ' ) 2:_ V ( f) - ( E + 3 EM + E) • 
The proof of Proposition 2 will be given in three lemmas. 
Lemma 1. o[-r < ~] ~ 1 - E. 
Proof: Choose a stop rule t such that 
(4. 4) 2 E , 
as is possible under the hypothesis of Proposition 2. Let 
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(4.5) 
2. J V{ft) do+ J (V(f) - E) do 
A Ac t 
where the equality is obvious, the first inequality because u < V for 
leavable r, and the second because V is excessive [3, Theorem 3.4.1.]. 
By (4.4) and (4.5), 
Hence, 
o[-r < oo] ~ o(A) > 1 - E.C 
Lenuna 2. 2 u(o') ~ V(f) - (E +EM+ E). 
Proof: This is a consequence of [9, Lemma 3.2].c 
Lennna 3. !:!(o') 2:_ u(o') - 2EM. 
Proof: For every stop rule t and T as in (5.3), 
J u(fT) do+ J u(ft) do 
T<t T>t 
because o and o' agree up to time T A t and [ 9, Lennna 3. 3] applies. 
Hence, 
!:! ( o' ) = lim J u (ft) do ' 
t 
> J u(f) do - EM, 
- -r<oo '[ 
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and 
u(o') = limJ u(ft) do' 
t 
< f u(f) do+ EM.a 
- t' 
'['<00 
Proposition 2 follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 and Theorem 2 follows from 
Propositions 1 and 2. 
Despite Theorem 2, it can happen that there is an optimal stationary 
plan for the lim sup problem and not for the lim inf problem (cf. 
[4, Example 7.3] or the example of section 2). 
For a leavable problem in which u is nonnegative and unbounded, 
there may be an optimal stationary plan for the lim sup payoff and yet 
the collection of stationary plans may not be uniformly adequate for the 
lim inf payoff. Here is an example based on one of Blackwell [1]. 
Example. Let F = {0,1,2, ••• }; u(O) = O, u(2n) = 2n-n for n = 1,2, ••• , 
u(2n+ 1) = 0 for n = 0,1, ••• r(O) = {o(O)}, r(2n) = {o(2n),c5(2n+l)} 
for n =·1,2, ••• ; r(2n+l) = {c5(2n+l),½(c5(2n+2)+c5(0)}. Then V = W 
and V(O) = O, V(2n) = V(2n + 1) = 2n for n = 1,2,... • An optimal plan 
00 
y for the lim sup payoff uses the selector y where y (n) = c5 (n + 1) 
for all n > O. However, this plan has utility O for the lim inf payoff. 
00 
In fact, it is easy to see that any E-optimal stationary plan B must 
satisfy B(n) = c5 (n + 1) for large n and thus would have lim inf 
utility O for sufficiently large n. So there is no such plan. 
This example may be misleading since the appropriate notion of 
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£-optimality for nonnegative u is the multiplicative one [S]. 
5. Other payoff functions. 
Let g be a bounded, real-valued function defined on H which is 
measurable either in the conventional sense as in [4] and [12] or in the 
snese of [7]. Define the optimal return function 
gambling problem (F,r,g) to be 
W (f) = sup{Jg do: .a E E(f)}. g 
w g for the generalized 
If g is shift-invariant, then results similar to many of those in 
section 2 can be proved ([4] and [12]). Even for a general g, some 
results are available [13]. 
A particularly interesting theorem due to Hill [6] is that, if F is 
finite and g is both shift-invariant and permutation-invariant, then 
£-optimal Markov strategies are available. It is natural to ask for such 
g whether optimal stationary families are available for finite problems 
(i.e., when F is finite and r(f) is finite for all f). A trivial 
example shows this is not the case even for leavable, deterministic r. 
(The example was discovered during a conversation with Hans Bodewig.) 
Example. Let F = {0,1,2}; r(O) = {o(O),o(l),o(2)}, r(l) = {o(O),o(l)}, 
r(2) = {o(O),o(2)}; g = u* + u* where u is the indicator of {i} for 1 2 i 
i = 1,2. It is trivial to construct a a E E(O) such that Jg do= 2, 
but Jg do.:_ 1 for every stationary o. If g is defined instead to be 
the minimum of u* 1 and then again stationary plans are inadequate. 
It would be interesting to characterize the class of those g's for 
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which optimal stationary plans always exist for finite problems. The 
example shows that this class of functions is neither a linear space nor 
a lattice. 
If g is shift-invariant, the problem of the existence of optimal 
stationary plans for finite problems can be reduced to that of the 
existence of equalizing stationary plans just as was done above for the 
special case g = u*. 
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